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IV.
Confucius the Shi:
The Search for the Historical Confucius by Wav of His Class Interest
By Christopher Schwartz (Graduate Student)

INTRODUCTION
The historical Confucius was a member of the Shi (knightly) class. As such, he was
subject to the socioeconomic transformations that affected his class during the Spring and
Autumn Period—transformations that eventually evolved them into the basis for China’s original
intelligentsia, the Rujia. Therefore, I will focus upon the philosopher’s social rank and
profession as the key to understanding the man he may have actually been. Specifically, my
question is whether Confucius’s philosophy of “sagehood” or “authoritative personhood”
(Pinyin: ren; Wade-Giles: jen*) was reflective o f his class conditions and interests, and if so, in
which ways? I argue that his condition as a member o f the Shi class was a crucial factor, for his
class interest informed, if not led to, his philosophy o f intersubjective “person building.”
A statement of rationale is in order, for our Platonic heritage tends to bias we Westerners
against the notion that fundamentally worldly concerns can and do motivate abstract moral
inquiry. This bias results from our very vocabulary of “worldly” and “otherworldly,” alongside
related oppositionals “theory” and “practice,” “being” and “non-being,” and so on. Such
vocabulary, imbued as it is with unconscious connotations of moral hierarchy, predisposes us to
disdain the historical conditions of philosophical thought. “The dichotomy o f theory and
practice has so long been presupposed in our tradition that the philosophical categories that form
the inventory of our speculative notions are themselves constructed with reference to this
dichotomy.” 1 Historical conditions such as class interest, ever morphing and contingent though
they are, are as much at the root of the question, “What is the good life?” as any other motivating
force.
In saying this, my intention is not to engage in Communist reductionism, or reductionism
of any other variety. I am simply looking for a historical condition that could help elucidate the
historical Confucius. I believe class interest is one such historical condition, and an important
one. The salient point to keep in mind is that even if Confucius’ motivation began with narrow
class interest, his philosophy was such that any and all human beings could and should partake in
its prescriptions.
Philosophical investigation is conditioned by historical circumstances. For example, no
less a Western intellectual giant as Aristotle professed the aim of living to be the attainment o f
sufficient leisure time for the purpose of involving oneself in political activity without
distractions (such as toiling for food or money). His vision of the good life was consistent with

Hall, David L. and Ames, Roger T. Thinking Through Confucius. Albany, New York: State University o f New
York Press, 1987. p. 38.
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post-Homeric Greek culture.2 The difference between Aristotle’s vision of the good life and that
of, say, Marx, is proof enough that the historicity of philosophy—that is, the place and time in
which a philosopher is thinking—is just as important as the ideas themselves. More to the point,
analyzing the socioeconomic and political contingencies underlying those ideas will tell us a
great deal about the evolving nature of humanity’s quest to answer the riddle of existence.
My procedure will be as follows:
(1) I will meditate upon the difficult nature o f the extant sources and establish my own
position with regards to which evidence to use.
(2) I will then propose a historiography for the era and use it to explicate the situation in
China during the Axial Age.
And finally, (3) I will explain the connection between Shi and the Rujia via the
philosophy and person o f Confucius.
I identify three ironies in the history of Confucius and the Shi:
(A) The Rujia were the result of the Shi’s adaptation to “feudal” circumstances.
(B) This adaptation was both necessitated and aided by the rivalries within the leadership
of the feudal aristocracy.
And, (C) the connection between Shi and the Rujia was prefigured by the philosophy and
person of Confucius:
(C-a) Defining “ren " as an educational model o f the self: Confucian ren was
fundamentally a philosophy of education. It thus prefigured the Shi’s turn to education as their
main vocation during the Warring States Period.
And, (C-b) the life o f Confucius as prototype fo r the Rujia: Confucian ren reflected the
Shi's state of intense socioeconomic and compositional fluidity. More importantly, it .was
symptomatic o f larger historical energies sweeping through ancient Chinese history. As such, it
also provided an ideological framework suitable for the Shi to adapt to the disruptive realities of
the feudal order.
I will address Ironies (A) and (B) in the section entitled, “Distinguishing the Shi from the
Rujia,” and Irony (C) in the section entitled, “Ren and the Shi.” The foundation for my analysis
o f Confucius is the exegesis of David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames in Thinking Through
Confucius. Like them, my perspective will be macroscopic. However, where they ask how may
we compare, contrast, and cross-fertilize the intellectual history of the West with original
Confucian philosophy? I ask what are the major underlying patterns or themes of his era, and
how do these relate to the Shi and the historical Confucius? Their aim is to get inside the head of
Confucius and see the West through his eyes. My aim is to get inside the world of Confucius to
get inside his head.
My position is that classical China underwent a monumental shift toward social and
political consolidation with heavy aspects of centralization. The loose agrarian affiliations of the
immediate post-Westem Zhou period evolved into organized “fiefdoms” with urban centers of
political power and culture. Those fiefdoms, in turn, evolved (and in evolving, succumbed to)
the Qin Empire. This transition was itself symptomatic of a massive process seen all throughout

2 Even after Socrates, ancient Greek values were distinctly Mycenaean. Athenian citizenship retained a conception
o f the good (agathos) from the Homeric past, specifically, that a good man was he who acquired enough resources
to preserve or augment his household. The pre-Socratic conception o f eudaemonia (“the good life,” “the felicitous
existence”), which persisted right through the Peloponnesian War and beyond, consisted of inheriting an estate
prosperous enough to render a man as nearly self-sufficient as possible. The goal o f self-sufficiency was to become
free enough to devote himself to politics, that is, the management and cultivation o f the state.
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the Axial Age civilizations, and I adopt the term “rectification,” from the Confucian expression
zheng ming (Wade-Giles: cheng ming*, translated by Legge: “rectification of names”; HallAmes: “ordering names” — An. 13:3), to explicate its patterns and themes as it occurred in
China. This massive “rectificational” sweep toward centralized consolidation was particularly
manifest in ancient Chinese society in Confucian philosophy. Thus, in answering my question, I
must ask the additional questions:
(1) What was the class structure of the Spring and Autumn Period?
And, (2) how did the Confucian personality emerge from that structure?”
Finding answers will require serious revisionism on my part. Revisionism in this case is
defined as a concerted act of stepping outside the constraints o f traditional Chinese
historiography and hagiography, and even previous Western interpretations, and attempting to
approach my subject mind-to-mind. In doing so, I am acting upon the assumption that real
people, even monks, exist in communities, and are as much defined by their communities as their
communities are defined by them. Essentially, I will be trying to approach my subject through a
viewpoint consistent with the Confucian vision of the human person as a perpetual act (li) of
self-recreation and signification (yi), and in doing so apply the highest standard of Confucianism
to Confucius himself. “It may be a mistake to think o f him as finding his message first and
attracting disciples afterwards... his disciples learn more from his, as from an inspiring
schoolmaster, much more than is on the curriculum,”3 and so, too, will we.
ANSWERS FROM THE ANALECTS
Though archeology has uncovered a wealth of data on ancient China, conditions are still
such in the subject area of the ancient world that historians remain reliant upon texts, scant and
flawed though these are. When I first set about writing this essay, I intended to recount the life
of Confucius. I now realize that to do so would be folly, for I have only a limited amount o f time
and ink to spend here. It would be more efficacious for you and I that I stay focused upon my
central question. In order to reconstruct his biography in any meaningful detail, I would have to
go about the arduous task o f collating and digesting for you the vast literary materials which
identify him as their author.
For the following reasons, I have chosen the Analects to be my source:
(A) It appears that the Analects were written over a period o f 30 to 50 years, beginning in
the Spring and Autumn Period and finishing either during or after the Warring States Period.
James Legge believed, “It is best to rest in the general conclusion, that it was compiled by the
disciples of the disciples of the sage, making free use of the written memorials concerning him
which they had received, and the oral statements which they had heard, from their several
masters.”4 Modem textual and philological evidence has confirmed that the Analects were
almost certainly not the direct work of Confucius’ own pen, but of someone or some group
intimately influenced by him.
And, (B) according to Benjamin Schwartz, “the consensus among modem scholars is that
our most reliable source for the early Confucian school, if not for the vision of the Master

3 Graham, A.C. Disputers o f the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court
Publishing Company, 1989. p. 10. See also: the introduction to Graham, A.C. Studies in Chinese Philosophy and
Philosophical Literature. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1986. pp. 1-6.
4 Legge, James. Confucius: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning, and The Doctrine o f the Mean. Chinese Text;
Translation with Exegetical Notes and Dictionary o f all Characters. New York City: Dover Publications, Inc.,
1971. p. 16.
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himself, is the collection o f brief dialogues and gnomic utterances in the collection called in
Chinese the Lun-yu [Analects]''5*7
Though modem scholars think highly of the Analects’ usefulness, Michael Nylan points
out that for a significant period o f time the text was neglected, remarkably by the Chinese
themselves.
Today, a student seeking to understand the basic tenets of Confucius and Confucianism
would most likely turn to the Analects, [but] until relatively late in the history of
Confucian classicism, during the Sui-Tang period (581-907), the Analects was
considered far less important as a source o f Confucius’s ideas than the Five Classics,
especially the Chunqiu or Spring and Autumn Annals, a text widely believed to have
been written by Confucius.
Scriptural status was awarded to the Five Classics, not the Analects. This situation was reversed
with the introduction o f Song thinker Zhu Xi’s Cheng-Zhu school, which treated the Five
Classics “on the model of anthologies, whose selection might vary in worth,” and their shifted
concentration to the Analects.17 The Cheng-Zhu school “claimed to have rediscovered an inneroriented hermeneutics devoted more to questions o f human nature than the old Han learning [the
Five Classics-based education], which had sought to define shared patterns of sympathetic
interaction operating in the political, social, and cosmic realms.”8 Analogous time-wise to the
Scholasticism going on in Europe, this change in focus had far-reaching ramifications for
Chinese history: “[a] dramatic turn that Chinese thought took during the Song dynasty, which
represented a virtual reassessment and reinvention of the Confucian message, as sweeping in its
own way as the Protestant Reformation of Catholicism.”9
Legge argued that the “books” (or chapters) comprising the Analects are grouped by
individual themes or common characters, though the chapters are not arranged in any way so as
to carry a continuous train o f thought or idea.10 For the most part, Legge’s observation carries to
today. Dissenting voices do exist. One comes from E. Bruce and Taeko Brooks, who suggest an
alternative interpretation o f the chapters’ organization based upon patterns o f language usage
within the text. In their view the received text is heavily accreted by interpolations from later
schools.11 Schwartz identifies other likeminded scholars, notably Tsuda Sokichi, “a radical and
iconoclastic critic of the text,” who “finds the work so shot through with contradictions and
anachronisms that it is unusable as a source of the thought of Confucius.”12 For their part, Hall
and Ames do not make the claim that the historical Confucius is to be solely or necessarily found . .
in the Analects. Rather, their goal is “to explicate the thought o f Confucius as it appears in the
Analects” 13 (my italics). However, I find their exegesis to be so convincing in its humanity and
cogency as to lead me to believe that the mind they describe as inhabiting the Analects must in
5 Schwartz, Benjamin I. The World o f Thought in Ancient China. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press o f Harvard
University Press, 1985. p. 61.
6 Nylan, Michael. The Five "Confucian " Classics. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001. p. 10.
7 Ibid., p. 55.
8 Ibid, p. 54.
9 Ibid, p. 10.
10 Legge, Confucius, pp. 12-13.
11 See: Brooks, E. Bruce and Taeko. The Original Analects. New York City: Columbia University Press, 2001.
12 Schwartz, Thought in Ancient China, p. 61.
13 Hall and Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, p. 11.
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fact be the mind of the man himself. Even were it not Confucius himself but some anonymous
philosopher or a “corporate personality”14 of several different thinkers, the name has been so
long attached to this philosopher or philosophers that pushing that distinction very far would be
nonsensical.
For a Western mind constructed upon the discursive tradition founded by the ancient
Greeks, the haphazard arrangement of the chapters both within themselves and between each
other indicates a want o f reasoning in Confucius. However, Bryan van Norden counters,
...as anyone who has been through an introductory philosophy class knows, recognizing
and reconstructing an argument in a piece of text is a far from straightforward matter.
One of the reasons for this is that most arguments in ordinary language are enthymemic.
That is, the conclusion, or some o f the premises, are not stated explicitly. It may have
been superfluous to state the implied conclusion or premises for the original audience,
to whom they would have been obvious. But to an audience separated from the original
author by gulfs of culture and time, the loss of background knowledge of key premises
may make even the most powerful argument seem a tangle of sophistries and nonsequitors.15
To this I add my own argument: Confucius was in fact a philosopher, as much as by Western
standards (phila+sophia) as by Chinese (zhejia).
(A) If you and I minimally define “philosophy” as the “love” and/or “pursuit of
wisdom,” then the Master certainly meets the criteria. He is fundamentally concerned with
questions which can be re-construed into English as, “What'is the good life?” and “What must I
do to be good?” as well as definitions o f justice, virtue, and truth, all of which are the key
concerns of ethical philosophy. “The Chinese compound that most frequently translates ethics is
dao-de [Pinyin: tau-te\ translated by Hansen: ‘way-virtue’; Hall-Ames: ‘road-focus’]. Classical
thinkers used the component terms separately through most of the period... [The] compounding
accompanies the emergence o f a dominant position. Any complete ethical stance requires both
dao and de.” 16 The connotations may be different— "Dao differs from duty ethics in not having
sentential form. It also lacks the axiomatic or. theoretical structure of Western systems. Dao
guides discourse in general”17 and “De does not simply consist in favorable attitudes, feelings, or
motivations. It is a hypothetical structure o f dispositions essential to the proper performance of
any dao. It is the ability to recognize, interpret, and perform a dao'M—but at base we’re dealing
with the same thing: “This unfamiliar conceptual structure with its background assumptions
generates a fresh dynamic. The dominant position... is that any plausible ethical stance requires
both dao and de. The reasons, however, are not the familiar Western points that we must do
moral actions ‘for the right reasons’ or ‘with the right attitude.’ We require de to vouch safe
correct performance of a dao."19
14 Ibid., p. 307.
van Norden, Bryan. “What Should Western Philosophy Learn from Chinese Philosophy?” in Ivanhoe, Philip J.,
ed. Chinese Language, Thought, and Culture: Nivison and his Critics. La Salle, 111.: Open Court Publishing
Company, 1996. p. 235.
Hansen, C. “Duty and Virtue” in Ivanhoe, Philip J., ed. Chinese Language, Thought, and Culture: Nivison and
his Critics. La Salle, III.: Open Court Publishing Company, 1996. p. 175.
17 Ibid., p. 174.
18 Ibid., p. 174.
15 Ibid, p. 175.
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(B) Even if we include in our definition of philosophy the requirement of rational
demonstration, Confucius still passes muster. “It is commonplace that even in the Axial Age
rational demonstration had a much smaller place in Chinese than in Greek thought... [The]
analysis o f Chinese concepts, identification of technical terms, uncovering o f the presuppositions
behind apparent gaps in argument, not to mention the grammar o f the language itself, has
revealed that most of the ancient Chinese thinkers are very much more rational than they used to
look.”20 Hall and Ames explain,
The dynamics of “thinking” in Confucius can be explicated as a continuing interplay
among “learning” [Pinyin: xue; Wade-Giles: hsueh] and “reflecting” [Pinyin: si; WadeGiles: ssu, szu), the consequence o f which is “realizing” [Pinyin: zhi; Wade-Giles: chih]
through “living up to one’s word” [Pinyin: xin; Wade-Giles: hsin*]. The
“learning" / reflecting” polarity might be roughly construed as the functional equivalent
of reasoning in the dominant Western paradigm, “realizing” would correspond to
“knowing,” and “living up to one’s word” would correspond to at least one meaning of
“truth.” [...] Thinking for Confucius is not to be understood as a process of abstract
reasoning, but is fundamentally performative in that it is an activity whose immediate
consequence is the achievement of a practical result. Far from being a means for lifting
oneself out o f the world of experience, thinking for Confucius is fundamentally
integrative, a profoundly concrete activity which seeks to maximize the potential of the
existing possibilities and the contributing conditions. Thus, in place o f any activity that
merely assesses an objective set of facts and/or values, thinking for Confucius is
actualizing or realizing the meaningfulness of the world.21 [Italics in original.]
Thus, in his eudaemonist concerns and his deployment of rationality—something revolutionary
for his time and place, regardless o f whether he realized it or not—Confucius was very much an
Axial Age thinker, equal to Socrates.
THE AXIAL AGE IN CHINA
The Axial Age was a global phenomenon of human development first identified by Karl
Jaspers. In his book, The Origin and Goal o f History, he points out a number of key thinkers in
ancient Greece, the Middle East, India, and China, during the time span 800-200 BCE, who
shared strikingly similar intellectual projects that profoundly influenced the history’s classical
civilizations. A.C. Graham writes, “China, like other civilizations of the Old World, draws its
basic ideas from [this] time o f awakening... The creative thinking o f that era seems everywhere
to have sprung up amid the variety and instability o f competing states; in China it begins towards
500 BCE, in a time of political disunion, and may be judged to lose its impetus with the
reunification of the empire in 221 BC.”22 My position is that Graham, who is working with a
traditional Chinese historiography that began with the Tso Chuan, is correct in the overall picture
he paints, but incorrect in certain details: the Spring and Autumn Period was not a “disunity,” nor
was the founding of the Qin Empire a “reunification,” but rather that the two represented phases
in a monumental sweep toward centralized consolidation.
Spring and Autumn society was the result of the transition ancient China underwent from
20 Graham, Disputers, p. 7. Note his reflection on p. 8.
21 Hall and Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, pp. 43-44.
22 Graham, Disputers, p. 31.
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the advanced chieftainships of the Xia/Shang/Western Zhou “sage-kingdoms” era to Qin/Han
monarchism via Eastern Zhou Fengjian (“feudalism”).23 I call this transition the process of
“rectification.” My usage of the term is derived from the Confucian concept zheng ming. The
concept makes its first explicit appearance in the famous passage An. 13:3, and is tacitly referred
to throughout the text, for example “Is it a ritual goblet that is not a ritual goblet really a ritual
goblet? Is it a ritual goblet?” (An. 6:25) and “Duke Ching of Ch’i asked Confucius about
effecting sociopolitical order, and Confucius replied, ‘The ruler ought to be ruler, the subject
subject, the father father and son son” (An. 12:11). Hall and Ames dispute the standard
translation of “rectification of names” and propose “ordering names” as more fitting to the spirit
of the text:
In so construing this concept... we must be give full account to the performative force
of naming. The prevailing interpretation of ordering names as the ‘rectification of
names’ fails to do so. It tends to treat names in terms of some theoretical schema that
has been inherited out of the tradition, and that can be hypostatized and hence rectified
by behaviors that satisfy the standing theoretical construct. [...] The standard
interpretation of zheng ming has it that there is an established definition—characteristics
and function—of what it means to be a ritual goblet or a ruler, and that any breach
between theoretical definition and actual performance is a source o f disorder.24

23 Were the views o f established historiography, both traditional Chinese and Western, accurate, we should
understand the three dynasties as actually having been kingdoms at all. However, archeological evidence shows
that, at best, they weren’t so much monarchies as highly evolved agrarian chieftainships, and that the peace and
stability they established was far from tranquil and absolute-in fact, the later Spring and Autumn feudalism seems
its natural, logical outgrowth, not its Frankensteinian mutation. Even the traditional chronology is deceptive.
Schwartz points out (Thought in Ancient China, p. 16) that the sage-kingdoms “may not have simply been sequential
in time, but may have existed for long periods as ‘overlapping entities.’ Here, again, there may have been no one
pristine state originating at one center but the simultaneous evolution o f several more or less developed ‘state
formations’ over a wide area.”
How can we account for the traditional perspective? One explanation is that it was the result o f the
political and ideological interests o f the Han dynasty. Since scholarship and religious sensibility have long been
entwined in China, insight can be gained by looking at the editorial history behind the Five Classics. Nylan points
out (Classics, pp. 42 and 47), “The very concept o f a sacred canon or scripture had spring from the imperial desire to
impose tighter connections between the central state and local traditions o f scholarship.” Just as the Western Zhou
regime probably appropriated certain Shang concepts (notably, the tian ming, “mandate of heaven”) to give itself
legitimacy, so too did the Han Empire appropriate Confucius for its own purposes. Part of that process of
appropriation was to establish continuity between the sage-kingdoms and themselves. Logically, then, the
interceding period o f the Eastern Zhou had to be derided as an era o f decay and catastrophic detour. Ironically, the
historiographers o f the next dynasty repeated this process for the Han, and so too for the next, and on and on in
various forms. To some extent, even the Communists utilized this technique in the 20th Century.
1 do not believe the explanation is so simple. Rather than invention, the dynastic historiographers were
actually tapping into a sentiment already widespread by the end o f the Warring States Period, namely, a profound
nostalgia for an idealized past age o f peace and tranquility. The destruction o f the Western Zhou capital in the
Eleventh or Tenth Centuries BCE created the bundle o f memories, trauma, and experiences that helped form
Chinese identity. Clearly, then, the traditional historiography was molded by its contemporary circumstances: just
as the Medieval European painters rendered Jerusalem a French or German town, so too do the imperial historians
render the Chinese past into something more Han than Zhou. As with their Western counterparts, for the dynastic
historiographers the past was not passive, a mere slag o f plastic that they shape, but was itself active, a reagent in
their imaginative process.
24 Hall and Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, p. 270.
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Though Confucius obviously evinced a profound awe for the institutions of the past, Hall and
Ames argue that he did not believe a Xerox reconstruction o f the sage-kingdoms world and
culture would have actually sufficed. “Our interpretation of ‘ordering names’ argues against the
priority of formal constructions by rejecting the suggestion that Confucius simply uses names
reductionistically to organize the process of human experience into some preestablished pattern
that is held to define the meaning, value and purpose o f life.”25 In Confucius’ mind, then,
salvation was to be found in creatively re-interpreting and re-applying the Western Zhou world
and culture to present circumstances. “For Confucius [the] doctrine o f ‘ordering names’ is the
starting point of sociopolitical order.”26
I use the term with purposeful irony:
(A)
On the one hand, from the viewpoint of traditional Chinese historiography and
Western interpreters like Graham, the transition of the Eastern Zhou era would logically
represent a gradual process o f “matching theory with practice,” “practicing what you preach,”
etc. The Eastern Zhou regime proclaimed themselves an empire, but the reality of their
government was the contrary. According to this perspective, it was not until the Qin and the Han
dynasties when true imperialism was (re)attained—in other words, a “rectification o f names” on
a grand scale.
And, (B) on the other hand, what happened during the Eastern Zhou era was consistent
with the Hall and Ames interpretation of zheng ming\ “A full explanation of Confucius’ doctrine
of ‘ordering names,’ in addition to reflecting his appreciation for the way in which language
conveys past realizations o f the world, must provide some account of how naming can be used
creatively to realize new worlds appropriate to emerging circumstances.”27 The vying aristocrats
and warlords of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods, and even the future Yellow
Emperor himself, were unknowingly realizing a new world from their circumstances, namely,
Imperial China—an “ordering of names” on a grander, subtler, profounder scale.
There is a catch: Chinese civilizational “rectification” is one o f those historical processes,
like its contemporary counterpart synoecism in ancient Greece, or broader processes like
technological invention and the spread o f religious ideas, that, once begun, is pulled by its own
logic toward a final end—centralized consolidation. Atoms are crushed together into molecules,
and molecules stitched together into tissue, and tissues compiled into organs, and organs
connected into physiological systems, and physiological systems arranged into bodies, all
brought about by the simple, necessary, and nearly invisible romance o f positive and negative
charges at the subatomic level. So, too, for ancient China: the very conditions that gave birth to
the Spring and Autumn and Warring States fiefdoms also brought about their absorption into the
Qin Empire. These conditions were the ambitions of elites, the need to amass, control, and
safeguard resources and trade routes, and the need to regulate class conflict within ducal
domains, all within the framework of Fengjian feudalism.
Rectification is therefore neither a symptom o f the gradual “collapse” of the Zhou
regime, nor of a long and grueling recovery. Rather, rectification itself is the change from the
Zhou to the Qin, and all other things from the era, even war and rationalism, are its symptoms. It
is a human process resulting from the expression of certain human traits when put under certain
geo-psychological conditions. Events from the era can all be re-understood within this
interpretation. The Zhou royal court’s flight eastward both threatened and spurred on
25 Ibid., p . 274.
26 Ibid., p. 270.
27 Ibid., p . 273.
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rectification, and the Spring and Autumn Period injected more energy into the process—
Confucius’ grandfather, the warrior Ho, fought for something far greater than he ever realized.
The catastrophic contest between the fiefdoms was neither a detour from the process, as
Confucius and his peers unconsciously interpreted it, nor the decline and calamitous fall of
imperialism, as scholars such as Graham interpret it. Instead, the Warring States Period can be
re-construed as an intermediary step between chieftainship and empire. The same is true for the
fiefdoms themselves.
According to this interpretation, the Spring and Autumn Period was a “chapter” in the
epic of the geographical and psychological expansion of the Zhou world toward its peripheries.
While the direction of their expansion was rectificational, the engine driving this movement was
a cultural trilectic very conspicuous within Chinese history:
(A) The interaction of the “civilized” fiefdoms in the Yellow River interior with the
“barbarians” beyond the frontier and the “semi-barbarian” societies which arose between them.
(B) The gradual absorption o f the “barbarians” and “semi-barbarians” into the Zhongguo
(“Central States”) core cluster.
And, (C) the cluster’s continual re-creation as a consequence of their absorption.
The Spring and Autumn chapter of this epic, then, is what archeological and linguistic
evidence suggests was an aggregation of several independent ethnicities and cultures in the
region into a large, multi-fiefdom, multicultural system of Fengjian feudalism and, to some
extent, the Ba (“hegemony”) system o f feudal alliances.28
An advisory on the use o f the term “feudal”: Schwartz explains,
The fact that many Western scholars have described the major features of the system as
“feudal” encourages doubt. Our own associations with this troublesome word is
generally that of the disintegration of power rather than o f stability and order. It
suggests fragmentation and strife... [Yet] if we define the term in a minimalist “system
of government in which a ruler delegates limited sovereignty over portions o f his
territory to vassals,” we may apply it to the early Chou [sic] situation. We must simply
add the commentary that feudalism presupposes the notion of an inclusive political
framework in which a superior ruler confers power from above and that if the term is
applied to China, we must stress that the “vassals” on whom the power is conferred are
very often members of the royal lineage. Conceiving of feudalism in this simple way,
one may disassociate it completely from the notion o f a preexistent highly centralized
state in disintegration.29
Schwartz’s definition of “feudalism” is consistent with my theory of rectification. It also helps
resolve the puzzle of why ancient Chinese feudalism instigated the development of professional
intellectuals, whereas medieval European and Middle Eastern feudalism stifled it. The answer is
that latter nearly put society into a kind of hypostasis, in China it dislocated society, and thus
fostered the type of conditions necessary for professional intellectuals:

28 Schwartz, Thought in Ancient China, p. 16
Ibid., pp. 42 and 44: “The high officials o f the royal court are often 'feudal lords.' The names of offices are vague
and fluctuating. The holders o f office do not necessarily perform the functions associated with their titles. Offices
usually are hereditary within what might be called the lower official nobility [Shi]. The renumeration o f office
holders was the reward o f appanages, which while not necessarily hereditary in principle often became hereditary in
practice.”
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Historically, creativity has been most in evidence under two prevailing conditions.
There is a creativity that is sponsored by a sense o f strength and authority in the state
where the country feels that it can extend itself into parallel traditions and entertain
external influences without threatening its cultural stability. There is also a creativity in
periods such as that of the Warring States where conditions are in such turmoil that
there is no cultural edifice to resist foreign influence. These influences infiltrate the
society to be grafted onto the culture as the tradition again rises and reasserts itself.30
The evacuation of the Zhou regime eastward—the event which terminated the era of the “sagekingdoms” and began the rectificational era o f the Spring and Autumn and Warring States
Periods—precipitated the formation of feudalism, which itself was cause and consequence of the
Axial Age in China. Additionally, the Ba hegemon was the institutional and conceptual
forerunner of the oncoming Qin Empire. Together, these two institutions reached their climax in
the Warring States Period, and gave violent birth to Imperial China. Yet, when one takes the
long view o f history, “casting a long glance backward” as it were, their imperial future was
strongly hinted at during the Spring and Autumn Period. Even then, the main culprit was always
feudalism, for the hegemony arose as a response to it.
It is ironic that feudalism had been intended to maintain order, when in reality the system
gave expression to the forces o f disruption, namely, the selfishness and unbridled ambitions of
the aristocracy. The result was war of ever escalating scope and brutality. The fiefdoms’
ceaseless conflicts reached several fever pitches before finally petering out: the Battles of
Chengpu. Bi, and Yanling, recorded in the Tso Chuan; the devastating conflict between the
‘Three Jins” in the opening phase o f the Warring States Period; and the century-long contest
between Qi and Qin that closed the Eastern Zhou era. Confucius’ lifetime happened to coincide
with a period of relative peace—In 579 BCE the fiefdoms Qi, Qin, Jin, and Chu finally met for a
disarmament conference in 579 BCE, and in 546 BCE Jin and Chu signed a second truce-but
even then small wars continued to erupt. Two notable conflicts from the lifetime of Confucius
were a civil war in Wei, during which a favorite disciple, Tsze-lu, was slain, and a major
confrontation in the coastal zone between the fiefdoms Wu and Yue. Indeed, the Wu-Yue
conflict, which occurred in the waning years of the Master’s life, was prophetic: in style and
substance it was a prototype for the maelstroms of the Warring States Period. Yet, amidst all this
death, important conditions were created that formed and forged the character of, the Chinese’s
original intelligentsia, the Rujia.
DISTINGUISHING THE SHI FROM THE RUJIA
There is no term for “Confucian” or “Confucianism” in Chinese. The terms we find
instead is Ru and Rujia, used in ancient texts to describe the self-identified followers of
Confucius, or more precisely, those committed to the “Way” of ethical behavior that they
believed originated with the sage-kingdoms and which was “transmitted” by the Master.
However, the term was also used to describe a type of intellectual who made the study of
antiquity his profession: a classicist. In Warring States and Han texts a distinction is made
between “ethically-minded” and “career-minded” Ru, but in none of the texts from any period
are the two fundamental senses of the term (Ru-philosopher and Ru-classicist) ever separated.
Two questions arise:
30 Hall and Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, p. 312.
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(1) Did “Ru” identify the same type of professional, or conflate two different types?
And, (2) who were the Ru?
Question (1): What type o f professional(s) did the term "ru" signify?
Philology supports the argument that the term Ru was used to identify the same type of
professional. Because Ru in its original usage meant “soft,” “first applied perhaps by men who
rule and fight to the softies who merely teach” quips Graham,31 the Ru-classicists probably
understood the act of studying to also be the act of teaching. Teaching in this sense meant
“thinking” as described by Hall and Ames: learning and reflection toward realization, which was
both intellectual cognition and “living up to one’s word.” Here we find a crucial overlap
between flu-classicist and Ru-philosopher which indicates that the original “Confucians”—the
philosophers who subscribed to the “Way o f Antiquity”—were the classicists. The later postHan distinction was likely not a division between two entirely professional types as it was
between different personality types within the same profession.
The Rujia were therefore philosophers who operated within a classical framework and
who were simultaneously classicists who went about their study philosophically. In fact, their
self-conception possessed no distinction between classicist and philosopher—to have been a
classicist was also to have been a philosopher. Their prototype was Confucius, for like him,
these professional intellectuals understood their mission to be the “transmission” (re-creation)32
of the customs, values, and ethics of the sage-kingdoms.
Whereas in imperial times, the pronounced aspect of the flu mission was civil service, in
pre-imperial times the pronounced aspect was education. “The rise of Confucianism [Rujia]
might then be seen as a pervasion of the class o f teachers, who discover through Confucius the
‘one thread’ uniting the diverse disciples [the Six Arts and Five Classics] which they teach...”
explains Graham.33 “If you wanted your son to have a more than practical education you always
had to send him to the [flu], however you might grumble that they were stuffing the lad’s head
with a lot of nonsense.”34
Question (2): Who were the Ru?
To re-state, I perceive three ironies:
(A) The flu were the result of the Shi's adaptation to feudal circumstances.
(B) This adaptation was both necessitated and aided by the rivalries within the leadership
of the feudal aristocracy.
And, (C) the connection between Shi and the Rujia was prefigured by the philosophy and
person of Confucius.

Graham, Disputers, p. 31.
32 Hall and Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, p. 25: “one must avoid the temptation to interpret Confucius'
thought from a strictly historical rather than a traditional perspective [i.e., agency-centered vs. continuity-centered
perspective]. To do so would make o f him an originator, a 'great man,' instead o f the 'transmitter' that he understood
himself to be. On the other hand, unless one remains sensitive to the meaning of creativity in Confucianism, the
understanding o f Confucius as a transmitter o f tradition will lead one to mistake him for a mere transmitter, and not
the sage that he indeed is.” A useful metaphor would be a clay pot. When a pot is tipped and pours out its contents,
say, water, it cannot be said that the pot created the water; rather, it held it for a period o f time. However, at the
chemical level, the water has been irrevocably changed by its stay in the pot, for trace elements o f the clay have now
been mixed into it.
33 Graham, Disputers, p. 32.
34 Ibid, p. 33.
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I will now address Ironies (A) and (B) in order to answer the question, “Who were the
Ru?" I will address Irony (C) in the next section, “Ren and the Shi."
The original demographic of the Ru arose from the Shi. The Shi were a
“protobureaucratic”35 element within the nobility who “composed and handled an impressive
array of documents, were experts in the protocols of ritual, ceremonial, and penal law, and
manned the lower ranks o f the military organization.”36 Essentially, they were analogous to the
Athenian Hippae. Think of Xenophon: the Hippae were not hoplites (citizen-soldiers), nor
helots (slave-soldiers), nor conscripts, but lesser gentry, or literati-knights, who held both
administrative and military posts. Like Xenophon, who was as comfortable with the pen as he
was the sword, and who sold his martial and mental services to both Persia and Sparta, the Shi
served as officers and officials, paid in the currency o f property and honor. Like Xenophon, who
was distantly related to the old monarchial line of Athens, the Shi descended from the outer edge
of the Zhou royal family tree. And like Xenophon, whose fortunes were pegged to the wars of
elites, the Shi experienced intense fluctuation in their fortunes as the power of their various
feudal lords rose and fell. Indeed, as the officers and officials of the clashing fiefdoms, there
were times in which they literally died by the legion. During the Spring and Autumn and
Warring States Periods, an individual Shi could rise to the heights o f power and prestige, as well
as meteorically plummet to destitution.
Beginning in the Spring and Autumn Period, canny dukes and barons realized that
effective competition meant more than just an arms race, but also a minds race.
The first step in transforming the role and status of the Shi was the appearance of
functionaries who served their lords in various capacities, such as sheriffs, stewards,
judges, and advisors. As Zhou feudalism underwent tremendous changes after the
collapse of Western Zhou, competition both among and within states made it necessary
for leaders to gather the best and the most capable persons as assistants. The term xian
(worthy; i.e., one combining intellectual ability and moral integrity), was introduced as
a criterion in selecting these functionaries.37
Naturally, they first looked to the Shi, but the gates for change had been opened: “This shift from
consideration o f status to that of competence eventually ushered in a new criterion of social
preference. The term shih [sic] thus acquired a new definition, now referring to a person of
excellence, one with high capabilities as well as character; it came to refer to a cultural status
rather than a social grouping.”38 The composition of the Shi became more open—in a sense,
more meritocratic, if unwillingly or so gradually as to be unconscious by the class’ original
constituents. They absorbed into their membership both the wayward or downwardly mobile
noble seeking a rebound, as well as the upwardly aspirant working man, even the occasional

35 Schwartz, Thought in Ancient China, p. 44: “Another aspect of this feudalism which differentiates it clearly from
medieval Western feudalism is that the protobureaucratic elements [in the] Shang are also very much present in the
literature o f the Chou [sic]... To be sure, in the Chinese case, the use o f the term 'bureaucracy' should perhaps be
avoided, and one wonders whether Balazs's term 'officialism' might not be appropriate for this period.”
36 Ibid, p. 44.
37 Hsu, Cho-yun. “The Spring and Autumn Period” in Loewe, Michael and Shaughnessy, Edward L , eds. The
Cambridge History o f Ancient China: From the Origins o f Civilization to 221 B. C. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1999. p. 583.
38 Ibid, p. 584.
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gifted peasant.39
As the definition of Shi broadened, a wider variety of personalities and skill sets were
inducted into the ranks. Schools of thought quickly emerged and conflicted. This process went
on right through the Warring States Period. Graham explains,
During the last centuries of disunion, with the bureaucratization of the competing states,
the at least partially literate knightly class had become increasingly open to the talents
and freer to serve whichever ruler offered the best terms. The thinkers of the Axial Age
are all in or on the edge o f this now fluid class... Although one could get rich by trade, it
remains the common assumption that the road to wealth and power is through high
office; consequently, nearly all o f them are preoccupied with such questions as when it
is morally right to accept office in these degenerate times (the Confucians), who
deserves appointment (the Mohists), whether it is better to avoid employment for the
benefits of private life (Chuang-tzu). Their whole thinking is a response to the
breakdown of the moral and political order which had claimed the authority o f Heaven;
and the crucial question for all o f them is not the Western philosopher’s ‘What is truth?’
but ‘Where is the Way?’, the way to order the state and conduct personal life.40
By virtue of their eventual preponderance in educational positions, the Shi-cum-Rujia was able to
outlast their competitors the Mohists, Yangists, Taoists, et al.
Thus, it was as scholars that these swordsmen were able to adapt to feudal circumstances
and secure a future for themselves. In addition, they were both the victims and beneficiaries o f
the feudal lords’ machinations. Bom and raised for a life of service in both military and civil
capacities, expected to be educated in the Six Arts of ritual, music, archery, charioteering,
writing, and mathematics, and cultivated in courage, etiquette, and wit, the Shi responded to the
troubles of their time with an investigation into the inner meaning of their responsibility to serve
the world. “It was a mentality that nurtured many of the best minds o f the time to devote
themselves to the task of defining and disseminating ideas.”41 It is here when the sword is put
down and the pen taken up, when the knight becomes the philosopher—and it is here where we
finally meet Confucius.
REN AND THE SHI
My quote from Graham above is in reference to the so-called Hundred Schools, during
which time the Shi completed their evolution into the Rujia. My position is that their evolution
was actually prefigured beforehand, in the Spring and Autumn Period by Confucius and his
philosophy. I identify two prefigurements of which I will elucidate in this section:
(1) Defining "ren ” as an educational model o f the self: Confucian ren was
fundamentally a philosophy o f education. It thus prefigured the Shi’s turn to education as their
main vocation during the Warring States Period.
And, (2) the life o f Confucius as prototype fo r the Rujia: Confucian ren, as described by
Hall and Ames, reflected the Shi’s state of intense socioeconomic and compositional fluidity.
More importantly, it was part o f the rectificational sweep moving through ancient Chinese
history. As such, it also provided an ideological framework suitable for the Shi to adapt to, and
39 Ibid., p. 583.
Graham, Disputers, p. 3.
41 Hsu, Cambridge, p. 584.
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participate in, the new civilization emerging around them—and from them.
Prefigurement (1): Defining “ren " as an educational model o f the self
Hall and Ames define ren as “authoritative p e rso n h o o d "meaning, “one who not only
extends his sphere of concern to embrace and serve the interests o f his community, but who
literally extends himself to take in his community.”42 A crucial factor in Confucius’ conception
of ren is “the coextensive and correlative nature of personal, social, and political development.”43
In the large scheme, this means:
The concern that Confucius has for the relational self and the communication that
effects it is a major theme throughout the Analects. The identification and articulation
of interests and importances is the basis for person building and the inclusion of others
in one’s field of selves. The authoritative person inherits the values and significance of
his culture and contributes to it in a process of symbolic exchange dominated by the
medium of language. This language is performative in the sense that, for the
authoritative person, saying requires the enactment of what is said in order to be true.44
Hall and Ames’ definition o f ren can be broken down into its constituent parts:
(A) The “relational s e l f ’: This concept has at its core the idea that the human being is a
combination o f instrumental and aesthetic elements. We exist for each other, supplying
resources and companionship, and even more importantly, generating meaning in an otherwise
axiologically neutral universe. In this respect, “relational selfhood” is much like how a
blacksmith forges a sword from raw ore and fire for use in ceremony or combat. In return; the
sword—as a product of the man’s efforts and as his source of income—qualifies him as a
member of the blacksmithing profession. The man is a blacksmith because he makes the sword,
and the object is a sword because it was made by a blacksmith.
Understanding the concept o f relational selfhood requires a ground shift in our post
industrial, Platonically-informed, and instrumentalist-tending grammar. For Confucius, a human
being is not a thing, an “it” or “what,” with a necessary static nature; rather, a human being is an
organism, a “him,” “her,” or “who,” whose nature is, in effect, an open question. So, too, is
existence an open question:
If we are no longer searching out the Mind o f God or the inexorable laws of nature, we
must search out one another. For, once the myth of objective knowledge has been laid
to rest, the world ceases to be construed as an objective datum for dispassionate
investigation and becomes the (relatively) articulated expressions o f environing others.
In other words, it becomes culture. And culture is rife with the personal creativity of
the best representatives o f the human community.45
(B) "Person building" or "person making": This concept is to the individual human
animal what zheng ming is to human society. If a person is in reality a relationally constructed
entity, then his or her life’s project should be re-creation o f themselves and their constituent

42 Hall and Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, p. 182.
43 Ibid., p. 123.
44 Ibid., p. 73.
45 Ibid., p. 120.
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relations. This articulation o f the self is performed via his or her setting among other human
beings. The goal is that both individual and community are “transmitted” into something that is
breathtaking and heretofore unthought-of, yet also contiguous with previous formulations. There
is no “thinking outside the box” for Confucius. What he finds more interesting and useful is
whether the contours of that box can be re-shaped in ameliorative ways. (Indeed, the most
extreme end of his logic would be to ask whether a box need be a box to be a box.)
Therefore, intersubjectivity is absolutely key to person building. Self-articulation is an
imperative for each and every person, lest we risk deformation into “retarded individuality”
[Pinyin: xiao ren; Wade-Giles: hsiao jen ]. Indeed, the entire project of Confucius’
philosophizing was built around finding the Way toward achieving ren\ The Way he
“transmitted” was one in which articulation could only be achieved through communal means:
(1) Using the inherited tradition of their community as a conceptual framework for their
articulation.
(2) Using the community as it exists in that specific historical time and place as an ethical
framework for their articulation.
And, (3) working toward re-creating the community as it could be, which is the actual act
of articulation.
Hall and Ames explain, “Jen* [sic] is the integrative process o f taking in and subsuming
the conditions and concerns of the human community in the development and application o f
one’s own personal judgment.”46 The blacksmith decides the way in which ore and flame are to
be united; he does so operating within certain conceptual guidelines as to the relative nature and
relative use of a sword; and he does so fully cognizant o f those guidelines and o f himself as a
forger of swords. His freedom comes in the form of playful yet serious delight he brings to his
task, and the originality that erupts thereof.
(C) Consciousness as “blacksmithing" : I chose the metaphor of the blacksmith both for
its historical appropriateness (the Spring and Autumn Period was a period o f widespread bronze
use) and its utility in explaining Confucius’ conception of human consciousness. To the Master,
human consciousness is cultural consciousness, for the development of the mind represents the
“forging” of meaning in a cosmos that, as the Stoics experienced it, is indifferent to human
endeavor, yet is metaphysically plastic in our hands. Existential blacksmithing is at the heart of
the relational self: each and every one of us is “the passage from nature to culture... The human
being as a maker of meaning has as his initial product, his self, his person.”47
Consciously to bring into being what is not is the purpose of action. This entails the
freedom of the human being, for without a sense that bringing into being what is not is a
real possibility, no intentionality is possible... That is to say, human consciousness is
bom out of a recognition of a state of affairs that are not the case, and human freedom
underlies the intentional acts that seek to bring into being what is not.48
Therefore, in the most profound way, to be fully human is to be action, or, as Hall and Ames put
it, to live in recognition of your essential performativeness.
(D) Language as performative action: The spoken or written word is itself an act which
generates meaning—blacksmithing that uses ink and paper or breath and thought instead o f raw
Ibid., p. 74.
47 Ibid., p. 74.
48 Ibid., p. 74.
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ore and fire. Language in this sense necessarily entails “the enactment of what is said in order to
be true,” or in other words “realizing” [zhi] via “living up to one’s word” [xin]. Additionally, it
is directly connected to cultural consciousness, for language becomes both product and producer
of li (ritual action) and yi (personal signification).
Li in Confucian terminology has several connotations, the most important of which is its
“disclosing and displaying function.”49 Be they the rules of religious rites or the rules of
interpersonal etiquette, rituals are not divinely commanded nor are they socially normative;
rather, they are the channels through which a man or woman may embody their community as
well as act positively and constructively in their historical setting. Yi in Confucian terminology
is shorthand for the goal o f achieving “a self-realizing person-in-context”50:
It is objectified in that, no longer asserting merely one limited perspective in its
interpretation of experience, it does not make any final distinction between self and
other in construing the world. To express this another way, the person-in-context
understands “self’ as a dynamic and changing focus of existence characteristically
expanding and contracting over some aspect of the process of becoming, the
interpretation o f which is grounded in and involves reference to the environing whole.51
Li andyi are, then, the fundamental building blocks to “authoritative personhood,” for the ren
person, in exercising his or her sense o f appropriateness and carefully selecting the way in which
they invest their innate dynamism into social relations, “authors” a renewed, rejuvenated,
recreated culture for himself, his contemporaries, and future generations.52 In total, to be ren is
to live, in mind and deed, zheng ming.
We can now see how Confucius’ philosophy was reflective of his class conditions. To
re-state, the Shi were entering into a state of intense socioeconomic and compositional fluidity,
which necessitated a major re-conception of themselves as a class. The Master’s approach to the
question of the human person was, fundamentally, one o f cultivation and edification, rather than
inculcation and obedience. The goal of his approach was self-articulation rather than
subservience. In other words, education rather than indoctrination, and his model for the self
was one in which the human person was malleable, capable of being shaped and shaping itself so
long as it had right knowledge.
Such a philosophy of personhood called for radical flexibility, not only with regards to
external (historical) conditions of constant flux and upheaval, but also radical flexibility for
interior (psychological) conditions within oneself. For Confucius, to measure one’s value as a
human being on socioeconomic conditions would be to beg disaster. Agreeable a statement
though this may be to a Westerner, the Master did not mean what we expect: whereas we,
schooled in Platonic dichotomies, would define the conflation of socioeconomic standing with
personal worth as “debasement” through “materialism,” Confucius defined it as undermining
oneself through excessive focus upon the individual self rather than the relational self. “The
process of becoming an exemplary person in Confucian thought entails both the dissolution o f a
delimiting and retarding distinction between self and other, and the active integration of this

49 Ibid, p. 86.
50 Ibid, p. 94.
51 Ibid, p. 93.
i2 Ibid, pp. 84,180-182.
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liberated self into the social field through the disclosure ofyi.”53 Too stringent an imagining of
one’s interior world through any means—and certainly through socioeconomic means, which by
their very nature fix people into niches would have the same effect upon a person’s self
conception—would result in the inability to adapt to new circumstances, to rejoice in the
adaptation, and to flourish, however humbly in material terms, as a result of the adaptation.
Thus, Confucian philosophy simultaneously provided the ideological framework for the Shi’s
new vocation as educators, as well as the values the individual Shi needed to cope with feudal
circumstances.
Prefigurement (2): The life o f Confucius as prototype fo r the Rujia
Turning to the question of Confucius’ life, when the Five Classics are used in conjunction
with the Analects and the other Four Books, in total the Confucian canon provides the few
relatively sturdy biographical facts that can be said about Confucius:
(1) He was a member of the Shi class in the fiefdom of Lu, a stronghold of Zhou high
culture. His family the Kungs were likely to have been descended from the military wing of the
class rather than the civilian, and that like many of the Shi during the Eastern Zhou era, they
suffered from declining fortunes.
(2) His youth and young adulthood were spent in “genteel poverty” and he was forced by
circumstances to hold menial jobs in the areas of accounting, grain distribution, and/or penal law.
(3) His middle age was spent in itinerancy, wandering from administrative job to
administrative job, from fiefdom to fiefdom. He experienced severe privation, to the point of
near starvation, and was also attacked by brigands and peasants. He ultimately returned to his
homeland, impoverished and undistinguished.
(4) Sporadically throughout his life he also worked as an educator. He settled upon this
as his final profession during his elderly years.
These facts are roughly consistent with his own autobiographical statement: “At fifteen
my heart-and-mind were set upon learning; at thirty I took my stance; at forty I was no longer of
two minds; at fifty I realized the ming o f tian [the will o f heaven]; at sixty my ear was attuned;
and at seventy I could give my heart-and-mind free rein without overstepping the mark.” (An.
2:4) 1 add the following comments:
(1-a) During the Spring and Autumn Period, “although one could get rich by trade, it
remains the common assumption that the road to wealth and power is through high office;
consequently, nearly all o f [ancient China’s intelligentsia, the Shi-cum-Ruja] are preoccupied
with such questions as when it is morally right to accept office in these degenerate times (the
Confucians)... [etc.]”54 (I will return to this in a moment.)
(2-a) The texts vary radically about the jobs he worked throughout his life. For the most
part they agree that he never made it higher than superintendency or similarly low management
(for example, An. 2:4 and 4:6). This is opposed to the traditional historiography, which would
have us wrongly believe that he had attained incredibly high position within Lu, all the way to
the prime ministry.
(3-a) It was his travels that familiarized him with the political and cultural conditions of
the other Spring and Autumn fiefdoms. Additionally, the variety of his experiences probably
contributed to his popularity among the young men who became his students.
(4-a) It was in his capacity as educator that he actually achieved his greatest success,*51
53 Ibid, p. 93.
51 Graham, Disputers, p. 3.
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though not materially. He was never pleased with this fact, and perished disappointed in himself.
Legge reports Confucius saying to his students,
“[...] last night I dreamt that I was sitting with offerings before me between the two
pillars. No intelligent monarch arises; there is not one in the kingdom that will make
me his master. My time has come to die.” So it was. He went to his couch, and after
seven days, expired. Such is the account which we have of the last hours of the great
philosopher of China. His end was not unimpressive, but it was melancholy.55
It is an incredible irony that he went to his death believing himself a failure, only to in time
become China’s “uncrowned emperor.”
Returning to Comment (1-a), the question of whether “it is morally right to accept office
[in] degenerate times” was a question unlikely to have occurred to an aristocrat, and almost
certainly would not have been of interest to a bom and bred peasant. However, logically it
would have been a question o f extreme interest to a Shi. That he attracted so many students—all
told seventy-seven, not including the eighty or so others in orbit—tells us something, too. Who
were they? Textual evidence indicates that they were, for the most part, o f Shi background
(Graham suggests that working men would have been more attracted to the philosophy of
Mozi).56 They must have been drawn to him because the historical Confucius—not the
Confucius transmitted/re-created by later generations into the universal religion of
“Confucianism”—was probably very concerned with the ethical and spiritual well-being of his
fellow Shi. As it happened, he would have been in a unique socioeconomic position to do so: his
family history “reflected the downward social mobility of many noble houses of the Spring and
Autumn Period. He retained a memory of the past glory, but had the experience o f a life of
service.”57
We can now see how Confucius’ life served as a prototype for the Rujia. His fluctuating
socioeconomic position was the reason and resource for his philosophizing and teaching. And
what of the vocation he finally settled upon? “Hardly any information survives about a teaching
profession before Confucius, but we have noticed how natural it is to see his thought as springing
from the preoccupations o f such a profession,”58 (my italics). That the Master had to turn to
teaching to earn a living is the crowning irony of his life, for so, too, would a great many of his
fellow Shi have to make the same decision not long after his death. Indeed, more than he may
have realized, Confucius showed them the Way to their salvation.
CONCLUSION
Confucius experienced and embodied the existential and dynamic tensions in what it
meant to be a Shi during the Eastern Zhou era. From his family background, he inherited an
intimate knowledge of the sage-kingdoms’ world and culture. Meanwhile, his actual life of
scraping together enough meager funds to survive, all the while wandering state to state for
frustratingly fruitless employment, inspired him to imagine a society in which individuals were
capable of transcending class limitations.59 Thus, in Confucius, biography, philosophy, and the

55 Legge, Confucius, p. 87.
56 Graham, Disputers, pp. 34,-36,45.
57 Hsu, Cambridge, p. 585.
58 Graham, Disputers, p. 32.
59 Hsu, Cambridge, pp. 585-586.
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broader brush strokes of history came together in a trilectical process that prefigured the rise o f
the Rujia.
We can now see how his philosophy emerged from the rectificational process at work in
ancient Chinese history. Ironically, the “Confucian trilectic” was analogous to the trilectical
development of Chinese civilization, that is, the interaction of the Zhou world with the
“barbarians” and “semi-barbarians” on its ever-expanding periphery. So, too, was the
philosophy the Master developed ever-expanding. It was the eventual transformation of the Shi
into the Rujia that initiated the change o f “Confucianism” from a philosophy designed to address
the needs and concerns of a particular class, into a universal creed. Just as China grew outward
to encompass, centralize, and consolidate its constituent fiefdoms and much of the continent o f
Asia, “Confucianism” grew outward to encompass, incorporate, and appropriate the sea of
individual minds that constituted the ancient Chinese people, devouring, absorbing, and re
contextualizing its competitors in Mohism, Legalism, Yin-Yangism, and even Taoism as it went.
What was this teacher’s most salient lesson for you and I today? We may have in
Confucius and “Confucianism” one of those rare instances in which the Adam Smithian notion
of enlightened self-interest came true. His program was essentially this: that a life of
compassionate service to virtue and state meant service to the very real flesh and blood human
beings of one’s social circle, and by extension, all of society. A life lived in this manner meant
the realization of the individual’s relationality in mind and deed. Thus, Confucius discovered the
secret of the Shi’s moral and professional elevation as lying in the harmonization of “self’ and
“other.” These ideas represented something very revolutionary in the context of ancient China.
Consider his peer and bete noir, Laozi, who, like the monks of Christianity, sought salvation in
nature, away from people. Confucius refused to believe that salvation was to be found in
isolation. His most basic article of faith—and his greatest lesson—was that salvation was to be ’
found in civilization, among people.
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